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Essays on the Economics of People 
and Places
Bryan A. Stuart
This dissertation contains three essays that examine the 
long-run consequences of economic and social processes on 
people, places, and the economy. The first chapter examines 
the long-run effects of the 1980–1982 recession on educa-
tion and income. Using confidential Census data, I estimate 
difference-in-differences regressions that exploit variation 
across counties in recession severity and across cohorts in 
age at the time of the recession. For individuals aged 0–10 
in 1979, a 10 percent decrease in earnings per capita in their 
county of birth reduces four-year college degree attainment 
by 9 percent and income in adulthood by 3 percent. I find lit-
tle evidence that states with more generous or more progres-
sive transfer systems mitigated these long-run effects. Simple 
calculations suggest that, in aggregate, the 1980–1982 
recession led to 1–3 million fewer college graduates and 
$64–$145 billion less earned income per year.
The second chapter, with Evan Taylor, examines the 
effects of birth town migration networks on location deci-
sions. We study over one million long-run location decisions 
made during two landmark migration episodes by African 
Americans from the South and whites from the Great Plains. 
We develop a new method to estimate the strength of migra-
tion networks for each receiving and sending location. Our 
estimates imply that when one randomly chosen African 
American moves from a birth town to a destination county, 
then 1.9 additional black migrants make the same move 
on average. For white migrants from the Great Plains, the 
average is only 0.4. Networks were particularly important 
in connecting black migrants with attractive employment 
opportunities and played a larger role in less costly moves.
The third chapter, also with Taylor, estimates the effect 
of social connectedness on crime across cities from 1970 to 
2009. Migration networks among African Americans from 
the South generated variation across destinations in the 
concentration of migrants from the same birth town. Using 
this novel source of variation, we find that social connected-
ness considerably reduces murders, rapes, robberies, assaults, 
burglaries, larcenies, and motor vehicle thefts, with a one 
standard deviation increase in social connectedness reduc-
ing murders by 23 percent and motor vehicle thefts by 18 
percent. Social connectedness especially reduces murders 
of adolescents and young adults committed during gang and 
drug activity.
Chapter 1
The Long-Run Effects of Recessions on 
Education and Income
Recessions receive tremendous attention from econo-
mists, policymakers, and the public. Most of this attention 
focuses on the short-run effects of recessions on workers’ 
labor market outcomes and firms’ investment and employ-
ment decisions. In addition to these short-run effects, reces-
sions could have consequential long-run effects, especially if 
they affect human capital attainment. Influential theoretical 
and empirical work emphasizes the role of opportunity cost: 
by reducing labor market opportunities, recessions might 
increase educational attainment (e.g., Atkin 2016; Becker 
1962; Black, McKinnish, and Sanders 2005; Cascio and 
Narayan 2015; Charles, Hurst, and Notowidigdo 2018). 
The opportunity cost channel is most relevant for indi-
viduals making high school and college enrollment deci-
sions during the recession. However, recessions could affect 
younger individuals, for whom mechanisms besides oppor-
tunity cost, such as a decrease in human capital investments 
during childhood, might dominate. Consequently, the size 
and even sign of long-run effects are an empirical question. 
This paper estimates the long-run effects of recessions on 
education and income, for individuals who were children, 
adolescents, and young adults when the recession began. 
I focus on the 1980–1982 double-dip recession in the 
United States, which followed large increases in interest 
rates and the price of oil. The recession was concentrated 
in certain industries, like durable goods manufacturing and 
wood products, and counties with preexisting specialization 
in these industries experienced a more severe recession. 
The 1980–1982 recession is a valuable setting because its 
timing permits the study of counties’ prerecession economic 
conditions and individuals’ long-run outcomes. I show that 
the recession led to a persistent relative decrease in earnings 
per capita and median family income in negatively affected 
counties. This persistent decrease in local economic activity 
is central in considering the long-run effects on individuals. 
I estimate the long-run effects of the 1980–1982 reces-
sion using newly available confidential data. I link the 2000 
Census and 2001–2013 American Community Surveys to 
the Social Security Administration NUMIDENT file, which 
allows me to observe outcomes in adulthood and county of 
birth for 23 million individuals born between 1950 and 1979. 
With these data, I estimate generalized difference-in- 
differences regressions that compare education and income 
in adulthood of individuals born in counties with a more 
versus less severe recession (first difference) and individuals 
who were younger versus older when the recession began 
(second difference). I isolate the effect of local labor demand 
shifts that emerged during the recession by instrumenting 
for the 1978–1982 change in log real earnings per capita, 
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with the log employment change predicted by the interaction 
of a county’s preexisting industrial structure and aggregate 
employment changes (Bartik 1991). This empirical strat-
egy identifies the overall effect of the recession on long-run 
outcomes, inclusive of any mitigating actions by parents and 
communities.
I find that the 1980–1982 recession led to sizable long-run 
reductions in education and income. For individuals aged 
0–10 in 1979, a 10 percent decrease in real earnings per 
capita in their county of birth, which is around one stan-
dard deviation, leads to a 3.0 percentage point (9.4 percent) 
decrease in four-year college degree attainment. The negative 
effects on college graduation are most severe and essentially 
constant for individuals aged 0–13 in 1979. This age profile 
suggests that the underlying mechanisms are a decline in 
childhood human capital or a long-term decline in parental 
resources to pay for college. Because I estimate small and 
statistically insignificant effects on college graduation for 
individuals aged 14–19 in 1979, short-term credit constraints 
in paying for college appear less important. I find little 
evidence of an effect on college attendance or high school 
graduation. For individuals aged 0–10 in 1979, a 10 percent 
decrease in real earnings per capita leads to a $1,300 (3.2 
percent) decrease in earned income and a 1.7 percentage 
point (13.9 percent) increase in the probability of living in 
poverty. Simple calculations and additional regressions sug-
gest that much of the long-run effects on income stem from 
the effects on education. 
An important question is whether government policies 
mitigated these long-run effects. To examine this, I charac-
terize two relevant dimensions of state transfer systems as 
of 1970. First, I measure transfer generosity as the amount 
of transfers per capita, conditional on standard economic 
and demographic variables. Second, I measure transfer 
progressivity as the degree to which states transferred higher 
amounts to poorer counties, conditional on standard vari-
ables. I find little evidence that states with more generous 
or more progressive transfer systems mitigated the long-run 
effects.
Several pieces of evidence support the validity of my 
empirical strategy. First, I show that earnings per capita 
evolved similarly before 1980 in counties with a more 
versus less severe recession. Second, I find no evidence of 
a relationship between the severity of the recession and the 
evolution of maternal education, infant birth weight, or infant 
mortality before 1980. Finally, I conduct falsification tests by 
estimating the effect of the recession on education for indi-
viduals aged 23–28 in 1979, using 29-year-olds as a compar-
ison group. I find no evidence of an effect for 23–28-year-
olds, who largely completed their schooling before the 
recession. These findings strongly suggest that my estimates 
reflect the long-run effects of the 1980–1982 recession. 
The magnitude of my estimates and the large number of 
affected individuals suggest that the 1980–1982 recession 
depresses aggregate economic output today. To gauge the 
aggregate effects, I scale my estimates by the 105 million 
individuals born in the United States from 1951 to 1979. 
Depending on the assumed evolution of earnings per capita 
in the absence of the recession, back of the envelope calcu-
lations suggest that the 1980–1982 recession led to 0.9–2.1 
million fewer four-year college graduates, $64–$145 billion 
less earned income per year (as of 2000–2013), and 0.5–1.3 
million more adults living in poverty each year. These num-
bers represent 1–3 percent of the stock of college-educated 
adults in 2015, 0.4–0.8 percent of 2015 GDP, and 1–3 per-
cent of the number of individuals in poverty in 2015. While 
these calculations could understate or overstate the true 
aggregate effects, as I discuss in detail, the long-run effects 
that I document clearly are important channels through 
which recessions affect welfare and economic growth. 
This paper shows that the 1980–1982 recession per-
sistently decreased earnings per capita in negatively affected 
counties, and children and adolescents born in these coun-
ties have less education and income as adults. In addition, I 
show that every U.S. recession since 1973 has persistently 
decreased earnings per capita in negatively affected counties. 
This novel stylized fact indicates that the 1980–1982 reces-
sion is not unique in its persistent effects on county-level 
earnings per capita, which suggests that it might not be 
unique in its long-run effects on human capital attainment. 
Similar long-run effects could arise from other shocks lead-
ing to persistent declines in local economic activity, such as 
Chinese import competition (Autor, Dorn, and Hanson 2013) 
and NAFTA (McLaren and Hakobyan 2016). 
This paper contributes to four distinct literatures. First is 
the literature on the effect of labor market opportunities on 
contemporaneous schooling enrollment, with a focus on the 
role of opportunity cost (Atkin 2016; Black, McKinnish, and 
Sanders 2005; Cascio and Narayan 2015; Charles, Hurst and 
Notowidigdo 2018). I complement this literature by estimat-
ing effects on a wider age range, including children and ado-
lescents, which is possible because of newly available data. 
Second is the literature on the role of early life condi-
tions in shaping human capital and productivity (for recent 
reviews, see Almond, Currie, and Duque [2017] and  
Heckman and Mosso [2014]). This literature provides very 
little direct evidence on the long-run effects of recessions 
on education and income. Furthermore, Chetty and Hen-
dren (2018) find little relationship between local economic 
conditions and the effect of a place on children’s long-run 
outcomes. As a result, considerable uncertainty exists about 
the magnitude and sign of recessions’ long-run effects. Evi-
dence on the size of these effects is necessary for weighing 
the potential benefits of mitigating policies, and for assess-
ing whether these long-run effects should be incorporated 
into theoretical and empirical models of recessions and the 
economy. My primary contribution, facilitated by newly 
available data, is estimating the long-run effects of a reces-
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sion on education and income. I find that the long-run effects 
on children’s and adolescents’ income are more severe than 
the effects on individuals entering, or already in, the labor 
market at the time of the recession.1
This paper also contributes to work on the welfare costs 
of recessions. Most of this literature focuses on the costs of 
intertemporal substitution in consumption (see the review 
in Lucas [2003]). In contrast, I study costs that stem from 
long-run declines in children’s and adolescents’ human cap-
ital attainment. My results imply that recessions are costlier 
than previously thought and point to new possible targets 
for social insurance and economic stabilization policies. 
Finally, this paper contributes to the literature studying how 
recessions affect subsequent economic activity. An influen-
tial strand of this literature examines recessions’ cleansing 
effects, which increase productivity as less productive firms 
exit and resources are reallocated to remaining firms (e.g., 
Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh 1996; Foster, Grim, and 
Haltiwanger 2016; Schumpeter 1939). My results demon-
strate that recessions also affect productivity in a markedly 
different way, by reducing children’s and adolescents’ human 
capital attainment. 
Chapter 2
Social Interactions and Location Decisions: 
Evidence from U.S. Mass Migration
(with Evan Taylor)
Theoretical and empirical research emphasizes the role of 
expected real wages, amenities, and moving costs in indi-
viduals’ location decisions (e.g., Kennan and Walker 2011; 
Sjaastad 1962). While theory suggests that social networks 
might matter as well (Carrington, Detragiache, and Vish-
wanath 1996), estimating the importance of this factor has 
proven difficult because of a lack of suitable data sets and 
research designs. For example, it is well known that immi-
grants from the same country tend to live in the same place, 
but this fact does not distinguish between the role of social 
networks and numerous common factors, such as moving 
costs, human capital, and language. Evidence on the effects 
of social networks on location decisions would inform our 
understanding of past and future migration episodes, the 
equilibration of local labor markets, and the impacts of 
policies that affect migration incentives. Furthermore, social 
networks might continue to attract migrants to their chosen 
destination for many years, thus limiting adjustments as 
economic conditions change, and ultimately contributing to 
spatial mismatch.
This paper provides new evidence on the effects of social 
networks on location decisions. We focus on the mass 
migrations in the mid-twentieth century of African Ameri-
cans from the U.S. South and whites from the Great Plains. 
We proxy for social networks using birth towns, which are 
particularly relevant in this setting, and we use administra-
tive data that measure town of birth and county of residence 
at old age for most of the U.S. population born from 1916 
to 1936. Our setting and data provide a unique opportunity 
to study the long-run effects of migration networks. We use 
detailed geographic information to distinguish the effect 
of birth town migration networks from other determinants 
of location decisions, such as moving costs determined by 
geography or railroad lines. For example, we observe that 
51 percent of African American migrants born from 1916 to 
1936 in Pigeon Creek, Alabama, moved to Niagara County, 
New York, while less than 6 percent of black migrants from 
nearby towns moved to the same county. This comparison 
underlies our research design, which asks whether individu-
als born in the same town are more likely to live in the same 
destination in old age than individuals born in nearby towns.
We combine this transparent research design with a new 
method of characterizing birth town migration networks. 
Our new parameter, which we call the network index, allows 
us to estimate the effect of migration networks on location 
decisions for each receiving and sending location and then 
relate these estimates to locations’ economic characteristics. 
We show that existing methods may mischaracterize the 
effect of migration networks in our setting. In particular, the 
influential approach of Bayer, Ross, and Topa (2008) could 
estimate strong effects for popular destinations, even if true 
effects are relatively weak, and as a result could misstate 
the overall effect of networks. Our method does not suffer 
from this problem. Under straightforward and partly testable 
assumptions, the network index identifies the effect of birth 
town migration networks and maps directly to structural 
network models. 
We find that migration networks strongly influenced the 
location decisions of Southern black migrants. Our estimates 
imply that when one randomly chosen African American 
moves from a birth town to a destination county, then 1.9 
additional black migrants make the same move on average. 
Migration networks drew African Americans to destinations 
with a higher share of 1910 employment in manufacturing, a 
particularly attractive sector for black workers in our sample. 
This evidence highlights an important role for migration 
networks in providing job referrals or information about 
employment opportunities. We also find that networks drew 
black migrants to destinations that were closer and more con-
nected by railroads, pointing to the importance of access to 
information and low moving costs in the functioning of these 
networks. In addition, networks are stronger in sending coun-
ties with higher literacy rates in 1920, suggesting that educa-
tion and related factors facilitated network development. 
We estimate weaker effects of migration networks on the 
location decisions of whites. For migrants from the Great 
Plains, our results imply that when one randomly chosen 
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migrant moves from a birth town to a destination county, 
then 0.4 additional white migrants make the same move on 
average. Results for Southern white migrants are similarly 
small. Furthermore, migration networks among whites are 
less sensitive to employment opportunities and moving costs. 
There are many possible explanations for the different effects 
of networks on black and white migrants. Given the myriad 
unobserved differences between these groups, this paper does 
not attempt to explain the black-white gap. However, one 
explanation supported by historical context and our results is 
that black migrants relied more heavily on their networks to 
overcome discrimination in labor and housing markets and a 
lack of financial resources.
To further study the role of migration networks, we map 
the network index to a structural model that generalizes the 
model in Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (1996). We 
estimate that 34 percent of Southern black migrants and 13 
percent of Great Plains white migrants chose their long-run 
destination because of migration networks. In the absence of 
networks, Chicago would have 29 percent fewer Southern 
black migrants, and Los Angeles, Detroit, Philadelphia, and 
Baltimore would have 11–25 percent fewer black migrants. 
Eliminating migration networks would reduce the number of 
Great Plains white migrants in several places in California, 
including Los Angeles, Bakersfield, and Fresno. While our 
model does not account for all possible general equilibrium 
effects, the direction of these effects is not clear: reducing 
migration from a town to a county could make that destina-
tion more attractive because of higher wages or lower hous-
ing costs, or less attractive because of fewer individuals with 
a similar background. Still, the model suggests that migra-
tion networks had important effects on the U.S. population 
distribution. 
We use the structural model to examine whether migrants 
would live in destinations with better economic opportuni-
ties in the absence of networks, as could occur if networks 
contributed to spatial mismatch. In the absence of migration 
networks, Southern black migrants would live in counties 
with a slightly smaller African American population share, 
unemployment rate, and poverty rate, while Great Plains 
white migrants would live in counties that are nearly iden-
tical. Migration networks have little effect on destination 
characteristics because migrants who did not follow their 
network moved to similar destinations. 
Several pieces of evidence support the validity of our 
empirical strategy. Our research design, which compares the 
location decisions of migrants from nearby towns, implies 
that destination-level network index estimates should not 
change when controlling for birth town characteristics, 
because geographic proximity controls for the relevant deter-
minants of location decisions. Reassuringly, our estimates 
are essentially unchanged when adding several covariates. 
We also estimate strong network effects in certain locations, 
like Rock County, Wisconsin, for which qualitative work 
supports our findings (Bell 1933; Wilkerson 2010). 
This paper makes three contributions. First, we develop 
a new method of characterizing migration networks. Our 
approach integrates previous work by Bayer, Ross, and Topa 
(2008) and Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (1996). It 
has desirable theoretical and statistical properties and can be 
used to study networks in other settings and for outcomes 
besides migration. Second, we provide new evidence on the 
importance of birth town migration networks and the types 
of individuals and economic conditions for which networks 
are most important.2 Previous work shows that individuals 
tend to migrate to the same place, often broadly defined, 
as other individuals from the same town or country, but 
does not isolate the role of social networks in the decision 
of where to move (Bartel 1989; Bauer, Epstein, and Gang 
2005; Beine, Docquier, and Ozden 2011). Third, our results 
inform landmark migration episodes that have drawn interest 
from economists for a century (e.g., Boustan 2010; Chay and 
Munshi 2015; Collins 1997; Hornbeck 2012; Margo 1990; 
Scroggs 1917). 
Chapter 3
The Effect of Social Connectedness on Crime: 
Evidence from the Great Migration
(with Evan Taylor)
For almost 200 years, the enormous variance of crime 
rates across space has intrigued social scientists and policy-
makers (Guerry 1833; Quetelet 1835; Weisburd, Bruinsma, 
and Bernasco 2009). Standard covariates explain relatively 
little of the cross-city variation in crime, which suggests 
a potential role for social influences (Glaeser, Sacerdote, 
and Scheinkman 1996). One possible explanation is peer 
effects, whereby an individual is more likely to commit 
crime if his or her peers commit crime (e.g., Case and Katz 
1991; Damm and Dustmann 2014; Glaeser, Sacerdote, and 
Scheinkman 1996). A nonrival explanation is that cities differ 
in the degree of social connectedness, or the strength of 
relationships between individuals, including those unlikely to 
commit crime. 
There is widespread interest in the effects of social 
connectedness and the related concept of social capital. 
This interest partly stems from the possibility that relation-
ships between individuals can address market failures and 
generate desirable outcomes that are difficult to accomplish 
with government policies. However, estimating the effects 
of social connectedness and social capital has proved to be 
challenging. Some of the most influential evidence comes 
from correlations between outcomes, such as income and 
crime, and proxies for social capital, like individuals’ partic-
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ipation in community organizations, their stated willingness 
to intervene in the community, and their stated willingness 
to trust others (Putnam 2000; Sampson, Raudenbush, and 
Earls 1997). These proxies for social capital reflect individ-
uals’ contemporaneous decisions to invest in their com-
munities, which raises the concern that these correlations 
reflect reverse causality or omitted variables bias. As a result, 
the empirical importance of social capital continues to be 
debated (Durlauf 2002). 
This paper uses a new source of variation in social 
connectedness to estimate its effect on crime. Migration 
networks among millions of African Americans who moved 
out of the South between 1915 and 1970 generated variation 
across destinations in the concentration of migrants from 
the same birth town. For example, consider Beloit, Wiscon-
sin, and Middletown, Ohio, two cities similar along many 
dimensions, including the total number of Southern black 
migrants that moved there. Around 18 percent of Beloit’s 
black migrants came from Pontotoc, Mississippi, while less 
than 5 percent of Middletown’s migrants came from any 
single town. Historical accounts trace the sizable migration 
from Pontotoc to Beloit to a single influential migrant, John 
McCord, getting a job in 1914 at a manufacturer in search of 
workers. Furthermore, ethnographic and newspaper accounts 
suggest that Southern birth town networks translated into 
strong community ties in the North. Guided by a simple 
economic model, we proxy for social connectedness using a 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of birth town to destination city 
population flows for African Americans born in the South 
between 1916 and 1936, whom we observe in the Duke SSA/
Medicare data set. We focus on social connectedness among 
black migrants because birth town migration networks are 
especially strong among this group (Chapter 2), and qual-
itative and quantitative evidence supports our empirical 
strategy. 
We estimate regressions that relate cross-city differences 
in crime from 1970 to 2009 to cross-city differences in 
social connectedness. The historical literature suggests that, 
conditional on economic and social opportunities, variation 
in social connectedness stems from idiosyncratic factors, like 
the right migrant being in the right place at the right time. 
To exploit this variation, we control for population, manu-
facturing employment (the largest sector in which African 
American migrants worked), and the black population share 
from 1920 to 1960. Our regressions also include the number 
of Southern black migrants who live in each city, to adjust 
for differences in the overall attractiveness of cities to black 
migrants, and for contemporaneous population, land area, 
and state-by-year fixed effects. City-level crime counts come 
from FBI Uniform Crime Reports. 
We find that social connectedness leads to sizable reduc-
tions in crime rates. The elasticity of the crime rate with 
respect to social connectedness ranges from −0.09 to −0.26 
across the seven index crimes of murder, rape, robbery, 
assault, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft, and is 
statistically distinguishable from zero for every crime. At the 
mean, a one standard deviation increase in social connect-
edness leads to a precisely estimated 22 percent decrease in 
murder, the best measured crime in FBI data. Our estimates 
imply that replacing Middletown’s social connectedness with 
that of Beloit would decrease murders and robberies by 37 
percent and motor vehicle thefts by 30 percent. By compari-
son, the estimates in Chalfin and McCrary (2018) imply that 
a similar decrease in murders would require a 55 percent 
increase in the number of police officers. 
Because social connectedness arises from individuals’ 
location decisions, a natural concern is whether our estimates 
reflect causal effects. The validity of our empirical strategy 
hinges on whether social connectedness is correlated with 
unobserved determinants of crime from 1970 to 2009, condi-
tional on the covariates described above. Historical accounts 
emphasize the importance of migrants who were well con-
nected in their birth towns and who worked for an employer 
in search of labor in establishing concentrated migration 
flows from Southern birth towns to Northern cities (Gottlieb 
1987; Grossman 1989; Scott 1920). It is unlikely that these 
idiosyncratic factors are correlated with unobserved deter-
minants of crime some 50 years later. These considerations 
provide qualitative support for our empirical strategy.
We marshal a wide range of quantitative support for our 
empirical strategy. First, 79 percent of the variation in social 
connectedness stems from a single birth town-to-destination 
city migration flow. This agrees with historical accounts 
that emphasize the importance of the right migrant being in 
the right place at the right time. Second, social connected-
ness is not correlated with murder rates from 1911–1916 or 
1936–1939. This implies that connected groups of migrants 
did not simply locate in low crime cities. The first two pieces 
of evidence support our key identifying assumption.
To provide even stronger support, we show that our 
results are robust to selection on both observed and unob-
served variables. Our results are robust to a battery of addi-
tional controls: contemporaneous economic and demographic 
factors, the number and concentration of white migrants 
and immigrants, and characteristics of counties from which 
migrants came. Our results also are robust to controlling for 
the share of migrants in each destination that moved there 
because of their birth town migration network. This variable, 
which we estimate using a structural model of location deci-
sions, controls for a range of unobserved characteristics of 
migrants. Finally, we develop a more general test of selection 
on unobserved variables. The main threat to identification is 
that connected groups of migrants moved to cities with low 
crime rates, and unobserved determinants of crime persisted 
over time. In the presence of this unobserved selection, 
controlling for the 1960–1969 crime rate would eliminate the 
relationship between crime and social connectedness from 
1970 to 2009. In contrast, if our empirical strategy is valid, 
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then controlling for the 1960–1969 crime rate would partly 
attenuate the estimated effect of social connectedness, and 
this attenuation would diminish over time; this is exactly 
what we find, which rules out the main threat to identifica-
tion. All this evidence supports our empirical strategy. 
Several additional results clarify the mechanisms through 
which social connectedness reduces crime. Social connect-
edness reduces crimes that are more and less likely to have 
witnesses, which suggests that an increased probability of 
detection is not the only operative mechanism. The effect 
of social connectedness on crime is not driven by effects on 
employment, education, homeownership, the prevalence of 
single parents, or crack cocaine use (which emerged in the 
mid-1980s). Other mechanisms, such as effects on norms or 
noncognitive skills, likely matter. We see the largest reduc-
tions in murders of adolescents and young adults, committed 
by acquaintances or strangers, during gang, drug, and other 
felonious activity. Furthermore, the effect of social connect-
edness on crime is persistent: even in the 2000s, when many 
of the original Southern migrants were no longer alive, crime 
rates were lower in cities with higher social connectedness. 
Natural explanations for this persistence include changing 
norms or skills, which are passed down across generations, 
and path dependence in crime (Nagin and Paternoster 1991). 
We use variation in social connectedness that has the 
unusual and attractive property of being initially estab-
lished decades before we measure outcomes as the result 
of a known process—birth town migration networks. This 
facilitates our primary contribution, which is providing new, 
more credible evidence on the effect of social connectedness 
on crime. We also contribute to the literature in econom-
ics studying how social capital and trust relate to various 
outcomes, including growth and development (Knack and 
Keefer 1997; Miguel, Gertler, and Levine 2005), government 
efficiency and public good provision (Alesina, Baqir, and 
Easterly 1997; La Porta et al. 1997), financial development 
(Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2004), microfinance (Karlan 
2005, 2007; Cassar, Crowley, and Wydick 2007), and inter-
generational mobility (Chetty et al. 2014).3 
More broadly, there is enormous interest in the causes and 
consequences of criminal activity and incarceration in U.S. 
cities, especially for African Americans (Evans, Garthwaite, 
and Moore 2016; Freeman 1999; Neal and Rick 2014), and 
this paper demonstrates the importance of social connected-
ness in reducing crime. We also add to the literature on the 
consequences of the Great Migration for migrants and cities, 
which has not considered the effects of social connectedness. 
This paper draws on Chapter 2 of my dissertation, which 
examines the role of birth town migration networks in more 
detail. 
Notes
1.  Recent studies on the effect of entry labor market conditions on 
workers include Altonji, Kahn, and Speer (2016); Kahn (2010); 
Hershbein (2012); Oreopoulos, von Wachter, and Heisz (2012).
2. This complements research on the effects of social networks 
on labor market outcomes (e.g., Bayer, Ross and Topa 2008; 
Beaman 2012; Hellerstein, McInerney, and Neumark 2011; 
Ioannides and Loury 2004; Munshi 2003; Topa 2001). These 
papers do not focus on the formation of social networks, which 
in some cases, like Munshi (2003), arise from location decisions.
3. Social connectedness is a broader concept than social capital, 
trust, or collective efficacy. For example, social connectedness 
might reduce crime by increasing the probability that criminals 
are identified, and this behavior typically is not included in 
definitions of social capital, trust, or collective efficacy. At the 
same time, our measure might capture social capital that was 
transported from the South. Definitions of social capital vary, but 
Portes (1998) argues that a consensus definition is “the ability 
of actors to secure benefits by virtue of membership in social 
networks or other social structures” (p. 6). Bowles and Gintis 
(2002), Fukuyama (1995), and Putnam (2000) emphasize the 
role of trust and reciprocity in their definition of social capital. 
Karlan (2007) makes distinction between social capital and 
social connections similar to ours.
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